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SYSTEMIC RISK AND DODD-FRANK’S VOLCKER RULE
JULIE A.D. MANASFI*
ABSTRACT
With the recent global financial crisis starting in 2007, the issue of
“systemic risk” has attracted much attention in our financial system.
Some legislators have asserted that proprietary trading by banking
entities, generally the trading of financial instruments for a banking
entity’s own account, played a critical role in the recent global financial
crisis. These sentiments parallel arguments that the practices of banks and
their securities affiliates in the 1920s were partly responsible for the stock
market crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression. At the heart of
these assertions is the issue of whether combining the businesses of commercial banking and investment banking increases systemic risk.
The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) contains provisions that
prohibit commercial banks from underwriting, promoting, or selling securities directly or through an affiliated brokerage firm, effectively erecting
a wall between commercial banking and investment banking. That wall
was gradually weakened and picked apart over the course of the next sixty
years or so, finally coming down with the Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which repealed the last remaining
restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act’s wall. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010 makes
the most sweeping regulatory changes in this area since the 1930s by reerecting portions of Glass-Steagall’s wall. The Volcker rule, contained in
the Dodd-Frank Act, restricts “banking entities” from engaging in proprietary trading, and from sponsoring, or acquiring or retaining certain
ownership interests in, a hedge or private equity fund.
One of the policy justifications for these restrictions is that the prohibited activities increase systemic risk. The implicit contentions in this
justification are that if the prohibited activities are too risky they could
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affect a bank’s liquidity, causing the banking entity to (i) be unwilling or
unable to extend credit to qualified borrowers or (ii) to fail, disrupting
credit channels. Similarly, some fear that banking entities may also fail
from exposure to failing hedge or private equity funds, further disrupting
credit channels. Are these implicit contentions underlying the Volcker
rule’s enactment with respect to the policy rationale of systemic risk well
founded? One way to attempt to answer that question is to look at whether
the blending of commercial and investment banking really played a critical role in the recent recession and in the Great Depression, as some proponents of the Volcker rule and the Glass-Steagall Act contend.
Parts I and II of this Article will provide the background necessary for
a discussion of these questions. Part I will discuss the concept of systemic
risk in general and describe the Volcker rule and its origins. Part II will
describe the history of systemic risk banking regulation in the United
States. Part III of this Article asks the important question of whether the
blending of commercial banking and investment banking produces the
alleged harm: increased systemic risk. The Article considers the argument
that blending played a role in the stock market crash of 1929. It also
considers the argument that blending played a role in the financial crisis
of 2007. Part III concludes that the claims that the walls contained in the
Glass-Steagall Act and Volcker rule are needed to decrease systemic risk
have not been necessarily proven or statistically supported. It seems that
the Glass-Steagall wall was erected in 1933 to address conflicts of interest
in the blending and to serve as a purported fix to the horrors of the Great
Depression in the name of regulating systemic risk—a wall erected for
more political than economic reasons in satisfying public outcry to do
something, anything, about the disaster. Eugene White’s bank failure statistics demonstrate not only that the blending may not increase systemic
risk but that there may be diversification, complementaries, and economies
of scope benefits to the blending.
The policy justifications of the Glass-Steagall and Volcker rule walls
must be detangled. If the conflicts of interest are the main harm we are
trying to address, it may make sense to consider other solutions such as
additional disclosures and regulations that protect the public from such
conflicts. If, however, the harm we are trying to address is truly systemic
risk, this Article posits that we need a better understanding of systemic risk
in a modern era of financial innovation before we erect the Volcker rule
wall that may decrease economies of scope, diversification of risks and perhaps even global competitiveness. Perhaps doing something must wait for a
better understanding of systemic risk and excessive risk-taking with respect
to today’s financial innovation and instruments. Once there, the Article posits that there must be some balancing of the synergies and global economic advantages created from the blending and systemic risk concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
With the recent global financial crisis starting in 2007, the issue of
“systemic risk” has been front and center in our political discourse.1 Some
legislators have asserted that proprietary trading by banking entities, generally the trading of financial instruments for a banking entity’s own account,
“played a critical role in the recent global financial crisis and subsequent
recession.”2 These sentiments parallel arguments that the practices of
banks and their securities affiliates in the 1920s jeopardized the soundness
of banks and were partly responsible for the stock market crash of 1929
and subsequent Great Depression.3 At the heart of these assertions is the
issue of whether allowing banks to engage in the businesses of commercial
banking and investment banking increases systemic risk.4 Commercial
banking traditionally consists of making loans and taking deposits for the
1

See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPEC. REP. ON REGULATORY
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY,
at 22–23 (2009); James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely & David C. Wheelock, Systemic
Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 403, 407
(2009); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Reducing Systemic Management
in Financial Institutions (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm (stating the need to reduce systemic risk to
promote and maintain stability in the financial system); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S.
Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Forum on Mortgage
Lending for Low and Moderate Income Households: Financial Regulation and Financial
Stability (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20080708a.htm (discussing instability in the financial system and the Federal
Reserve’s analysis that “allowing Bear Stearns to fail ... would likely have had extremely
adverse implications for the financial system”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed.
Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition: Risk Management in Financial Institutions (May 15, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news events/speech/bernanke20080515a.htm
(describing the origins of the current financial turmoil, including subprime mortgages and
failures in management of risk by large financial institutions).
2
Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, Policy Essay, The Dodd-Frank Act
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address
Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 515–16 (2011) [hereinafter Merkley &
Levin]. For purposes of this Article, the term “proprietary trading” shall include the purchase and sale of financial instruments for the banking entity’s own account and
investment in private funds managed or sponsored by the banking entity. Id. at 515 n.1.
3
Id. at 516–17; see also Eugene Nelson White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An
Analysis of the Investment Banking Activities of National Banks, 23 EXPLORATIONS IN
ECON. HIST. 33, 33 (1986) [hereinafter White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act].
4
Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 516–17.
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net interest income.5 Investment banking generally consists of securities
underwriting,6 dealing, trading, and other related activities7 for fee and
commission income.8
The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) contained provisions
that prohibited commercial banks from engaging in investment banking
directly or through an affiliated brokerage firm, effectively erecting a wall
between commercial banking and investment banking.9 That wall was gradually weakened and picked apart over the course of the next sixty years or
so, finally coming down with the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which repealed the last remaining restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act’s wall.10 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010 makes the most
sweeping regulatory changes in this area since the 1930s by re-erecting portions of Glass-Steagall’s wall.11 The Volcker rule, contained in the DoddFrank Act, restricts “banking entities” from engaging in proprietary trading,
and from sponsoring, or acquiring or retaining certain ownership interests
in, a hedge or private equity fund.12
5

See ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES IN
ACTION 511, 513–14 (2003).
6
The underwriting of securities issues involves guaranteeing a price at which the new
equity or bond will sell.
7
Other related activities include brokerage, financing services, and securities handling,
for example.
8
MICHEL FLEURIET, INVESTMENT BANKING EXPLAINED: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE
INDUSTRY 42–43 (2008).
9
See Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48
Stat. 162, 184–85, 188–89, 194 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
10
See Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Blilely) Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). Section 101 repealed sections 20 and 32
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited affiliations between commercial and investment banks. Id. Note that sections 16 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibit
what affiliates can do directly, are still in effect.
11
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)).
12
Id. “Banking entities” is “defined to include ... insured depository institutions, ...
compan[ies] that control[] an insured depository institution or [companies] treated as a
[Bank Holding Company] under the [Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)], and any
subsidiary or affiliate of those entities.” Understanding the New Financial Reform
Legislation: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, LEGAL
UPDATE (Mayer Brown), July 2010, at 65 (July 2010) [hereinafter Understanding the
New Financial Reform Legislation], available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files
/Publication/1ec275f4-5618-4a63-9d383129010c06db/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e
f42ecce-49ff-44b2-b37a-72b81d87fb79/Final-FSRE-Outlinev2.pdf.
Thus, the prohibitions would apply to: FDIC-insured commercial
banks, thrifts, and industrial loan companies (with an exception for
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One of the policy justifications for these restrictions is that the prohibited activities increase systemic risk.13 The implicit contentions in this justification are that if the prohibited activities are too risky they could affect
a bank’s liquidity, causing the banking entity to be unable to extend credit
to qualified borrowers or to fail, disrupting credit channels.14 Similarly,
some individuals fear that banking entities may also fail from exposure to
failing hedge or private equity funds, further disrupting credit channels.15
Are these implicit contentions underlying the Volcker rule’s enactment
with respect to the policy rationale of systemic risk well founded? One
way to attempt to answer that question is to look at whether the blending
of commercial and investment banking really played a critical role in the
recent recession and in the Great Depression, as some proponents of the
Volcker rule and the Glass-Steagall Act contend. Parts I and II of this Article
will provide the background necessary for a discussion of these questions.
Part I will discuss the concept of systemic risk in general and describe the
Volcker rule and its origins. Part II will describe the relatively recent history of systemic risk banking regulation in the United States.
Part III of this Article asks the important question of whether the blending of commercial banking and investment banking produces the alleged
harm: increased systemic risk. The Article considers the argument that
blending played a role in the stock market crash of 1929.16 It also considers
the argument that blending played a role in the financial crisis of 2007.17
insured depository institutions that function solely in a trust or fiduciary
capacity)...; any company that controls those depository institutions,
regardless of the depository institution’s size; any non-U.S. bank (and
any parent company) that has a US branch, agency, commercial lending
company[,] or insured depository institution subsidiary; and any
subsidiary of the foregoing entities.
Id. at 66.
13
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 538, 546.
14
See JOHN KAMBHU, TIL SCHUERMANN & KEVIN J. STIROH, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 291, HEDGE FUNDS, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, AND SYSTEMIC
RISK 11–12 (2007), http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr291.pdf (discussing
that collateralizing these exposures may not be sufficient to mitigate against this risk because collateral values may fall. However, recognizing that banks’ current exposures are
heavily collateralized and each bank has some interest in mitigating these risks.). But see
Anne Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 294 (2010) (discussing how the failure of Amaranth “did not
have a destabilizing effect because counterparties to these funds held sufficient collateral”).
15
See KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, supra note 14, at 13 (citing Hyun Song
Shin, Risk and Liquidity in a System Context (BIS, Working Paper No. 212, 2006)).
16
See discussion infra Part III.A.
17
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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Part III concludes that the claims that the walls contained in the GlassSteagall Act and Volcker rule are needed to decrease systemic risk have
not been necessarily proven or statistically supported.18 It seems that the
Glass-Steagall wall was erected in 1933 to address conflicts of interest in
the blending and to serve as a purported fix to the horrors of the Great
Depression in the name of regulating systemic risk19—a wall erected for
more political than economic reasons in satisfying public outcry to do
something, anything, about the disaster. Eugene White’s bank failure
statistics demonstrate not only that the blending may not increase systemic
risk, but that there may be diversification,20 complementaries,21 and economies of scope benefits22 to the blending. The hearings and legislative
history of both the Glass-Steagall Act and the Volcker rule emphasize the
conflicts of interest with the blending as opposed to the systemic risk
concerns.23 Conflicts of interest might include, for example, banks making
loans on preferential terms to customers who purchase securities underwritten by the bank, taking advantage of their knowledge of their
clients’ investment activities, or taking advantage of their influence over
their clients.24
The policy justifications of the Glass-Steagall and Volcker rule walls
must be detangled. If the conflicts of interest are the main harm we are
trying to address, it may make sense to consider other solutions such as
additional disclosures and regulations that protect the public from such
conflicts. If, however, the harm we are trying to address is truly systemic
risk, this Article posits that we need a better understanding of systemic
risk in a modern era of financial innovation before we erect the Volcker
18

See discussion infra Part III.
See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 155–56 (1934).
20
Diversification generally refers to reducing risk by investing in a variety of assets.
O’SULLIVAN & SHEFFRIN, supra note 5, at 273–74. The idea is that a diversified portfolio
will have less risk than the weighted average risk of its constituent assets. See id.
21
Generally, for a good to be a complementary good, its demand increases when the
price of another good decreases. Id. at 88. An example often given is that usually the
demand for hot dog buns will increase when the price of hot dogs is decreased so hot dog
buns and hot dogs are complementary goods. See id. (utilizing the example of skis and
ski boots to explain complementary goods).
22
Generally, “economies of scope” refers to the lowering average cost for a firm in
producing two or more products. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268 (1981). There can also be synergies between products such
that offering a complete range of products gives the consumer a more desirable product
offering than a single product would. Id.
23
See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 113–14, 155–56, 185–86, 351–52, 362, 393 (1934);
Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 532–33, 539.
24
Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 522–23, 526.
19
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rule wall that may decrease economies of scope, diversification of risks,
and perhaps even global competitiveness. Perhaps doing something must
wait for a better understanding of systemic risk and excessive risk-taking
with respect to today’s financial innovation and instruments. Once there,
the Article posits that there must be some balancing of the synergies and
global economic advantages created from the blending and systemic risk
concerns. The Dodd-Frank Act requires more transparency and disclosures
of systemically significant entities.25 However, it also simultaneously
erects the Volcker rule wall between commercial banking and investment
banking.26 The response to the recent recession must be nuanced. With
more transparency comes more information to decide whether there
should be a wall. It is important to consider that there may be a hefty cost
to erecting the wall.
I. BACKGROUND: SYSTEMIC RISK AND DODD-FRANK’S VOLCKER RULE
A. Systemic Risk
There is no widely accepted uniform definition of systemic risk.27 One
way to define systemic risk is that it is the risk of collapse of an entire financial system or market “serious enough to quite probably have significant
adverse effects on the real economy.”28 The “real economy” simply refers
to the goods, services, and resources aspects of the economy as opposed to
financial markets.29
25

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–74 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2012)).
26
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–21.
27
See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2011) (recognizing “that
the term ‘systemic risk’ has been used in various ways, sometimes inconsistently”); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 247–48 (2008). Alan Greenspan stated that
the “very definition [of systemic risk] is still somewhat unsettled.” George G. Kaufman,
Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 20–21 n.5 (1996)
(quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at a Research Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk (Nov. 16, 1995)).
28
The G10 Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, at 126 (Jan. 2001),
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf; see also George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott,
What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 THE
INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003) (stating that “[s]ystemic risk refers to the risk or probability
of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or
components, and is evidenced by comovements (correlation) among most or all the
parts”) (emphasis omitted).
29
Real Economy Definition, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term
=real-economy (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
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Bank lending affects the real economy.30 Banking entities are unique
with respect to their place in our financial system. An expansion of bank
deposits results in an increase of the money circulating in an economy.31
This is because when a bank receives a deposit, the bank may keep a portion of that deposit as reserves and loan out the rest. The borrower of that
loan may deposit that borrowed money into a bank that keeps a portion of
that deposit and loans out the rest. Therefore, changes in bank deposits
change the amount of outstanding credit and the money supply. This concept is known as the credit multiplier.32 In this way, banking entities play a
special role in the stability of the U.S. financial system and that is typically
the reason given for why they have access to certain governmental subsidies
like Federal Reserve credit, federal insurance, and emergency services.33
Systemic risk involves a potential cascading failure in a system or market due to interlinkages and interdependencies.34 The chain reaction that is
30
Adam B. Ashcraft, Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced
Failure of Healthy Banks, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1712, 1728 (2005) (“This paper has developed evidence that healthy-bank failures have significant and apparently permanent effects
on real economic activity. While there are important caveats to keep in mind concerning
the interpretation of pro forma failed bank balance sheets, much of this effect can be
explained by a severe contraction of bank lending.”); KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH,
supra note 14, at 10.
31
The concept is the credit multiplier.
[It] magnifies small changes in bank deposits into changes in the amount
of outstanding credit and the money supply. For example, a bank receives
a deposit of $100,000, and the Reserve Requirement is 20%. The bank
is thus required to keep $20,000 in the form of reserves. The remaining
$80,000 becomes a loan, which is deposited in the borrower’s bank.
When the borrower’s bank sets aside the $16,000 required reserve out
of the $80,000, $64,000 is available for another loan and another deposit, and so on. Carried out to its theoretical limit, the original deposit
of $100,000 could expand into a total of $500,000 in deposits and
$400,000 in credit.
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS
(8th ed. 2010). Example from BARBARA CASU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BANKING (2006).
32
CASU, supra note 31.
33
See Paul Volcker, Commentary on the Restrictions on Proprietary Trading by Insured
Depositary Institutions 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents
/Volcker_Rule_Essay_2-13-12.pdf (stating that proprietary trading “does not justify the
taxpayer subsidy implicit in routine access to Federal Reserve credit, deposit insurance or
emergency support”).
34
Regulatory Restructuring: Balancing the Independence of the Federal Reserve in
Monetary Policy with Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
Monetary Policy and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 88 (2009) (testimony of John Taylor) (“[S]ystemic risk in the financial sector [is] a risk that impacts the
entire financial system and real economy, through cascading, contagion, and chain-reaction
effects.”); see also Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 200.
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often looked at is a banking panic.35 Banking panics historically have occurred when customers withdrew their deposits from a bank in fear that
the bank would become insolvent, causing a chain reaction of runs on other
banks.36 The chain reaction may have occurred because other banks were
owed money by the bank in trouble or simply because fear spread across
the general populous.37 It is thought that much of the Great Depression’s
economic damage was caused by bank runs.38 Some scholars contend that the
recent economic crisis of 2007–2010 was a run by investors, not on banks,
but on the shadow banking system.39 The term “shadow banking system”
refers to the fact that financial institutions outside the traditional banking
system, such as hedge funds and investment banks, have acted as intermediaries between investors and borrowers, and increasingly undertaken roles
traditionally played by banks, including lending capital to U.S. businesses.40
These intermediaries have included investment banks, hedge funds, and
others that have expanded the liquidity in many global financial markets.41
Many think of very large institutions when they think of systemic significance. However, systemic risk does not only stem from being “too big
35

See generally George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crisis and Systemic
Risk: Lessons from Recent Events, 24 ECON. PERSPECTIVES, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI.,
no. 3, at 9–11 (2000) (discussing banking crises).
36
Gary Gorton, Banking Panics and Business Cycles¸ 40 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 751,
751–54 (1988); Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri, Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance
of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks 2, 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14280, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14280.
37
Gorton, supra note 36, at 751–55.
38
Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation
of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 259–60 (1983).
39
See Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis Prepared for
the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2 (Feb. 20, 2010), available at http://online
.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/crisisqa0210.pdf.
40
Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2008: Written Testimony for the House Oversight Committee Hearing on Hedge Funds 4
(Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301217. In the lending context,
this role may consist of being an intermediary between investors and borrowers (i.e.,
funneling funds from the investor to the borrower). See id. The non-bank institution will
thereby profit from fees and/or the difference in interest rates that it pays the investors
and what it receives from the borrowers. This role may also consist of purchasing debt
securities on the secondary market. These non-bank institutions may include hedge funds,
investment banks, structured investment vehicles, and other non-bank entities. Id.
41
Id. (describing financial intermediaries); see also Roger Ferguson & David Laster,
Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, FIN. STABILITY REV., Apr. 2007, at 45, 47–48, available at
http://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de
_la_stabilite_financiere/etud5_0407.pdf (explaining that hedge funds have contributed to
market efficiency and financial stability by expanding liquidity and thereby lowering the
cost of capital).

2013]

SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE VOLCKER RULE

191

to fail” in terms of market share.42 The Dodd-Frank Act recently created the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), in part to identify, monitor,
and respond to risks to the financial stability of the United States.43 In designating certain “nonbank” financial companies to be supervised by the Federal
Reserve’s board of governors, some characteristics that were considered were
“the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company
with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding companies;”44 “the importance of the company as a source of credit ...
and as a source of liquidity for the United States financial system;”45 and the
“interconnectedness ... of the company.”46 Clearly, Congress felt that there
were factors in determining systemic risk that needed to be looked at in
addition to the size and scale of the activities of the company.47 The International Monetary Fund also determined, in a recent G-20 commissioned
study, that institutions that were interconnected, not just the largest institutions, could impair financial markets.48 Professor Hal Scott stated in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs on the Volcker rule that “the absolute size of an institution is not
the predicate for systemic risk; it is rather the size of its debt, its derivatives positions, and the scope and complexity of many other financial relationships running between the firm, other institutions, and the wider financial
system.”49 Therefore, while we certainly need more study on what actually
causes systemic risk or a cascading failure, systemic risk in general can be
thought of as a cascading failure, like dominoes, that affects the real economy.
42

See, e.g., Rivière, supra note 14, at 293 (“Indeed, the failure of LTCM, a hedge fund
worth $4 billion, posed a systemic risk because of its exposure to banks. On the other
hand, the failure of Amaranth, which was worth more than double that of LTCM ($9.5
billion), had no systemic impact.” (citing Rama Cont, Amal Moussa & Andreea Minca, Too
Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and Systemic Risk in Financial Networks (Columbia
Ctr. for Fin. Eng’g, Working Paper, 2009))).
43
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 111–112, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–95 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012)).
44
§ 113(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1398.
45
§ 113(a)(2)(D), 124 Stat. at 1398.
46
§ 113(a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. at 1398.
47
This is evidenced by the multi-faceted approach to defining “nonbank financial companies” that will be supervised and regulated by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
See § 102(a)(1)(4)(A)–(D), § 113, 124 Stat. at 1391–92, 1398–99.
48
See Staff of the Int’l Monetary Fund & the Bank for Int’l Settlements, & the Secretariat
of the Fin. Stability Board, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial
Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, Report to the G-20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 9 (Oct. 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np
/g20/pdf/100109.pdf.
49
Implications of the “Volcker Rules” for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 51 (2010) (statement of Hal Scott,
Nomura Professor of International Systems, Harvard Law School).
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B. Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule
The Volcker rule, in section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, generally restricts “banking entities”50 from engaging in proprietary trading for the
entity’s own account. This includes trading in any security, derivative, future, option, or any other security or financial instrument designated by the
federal banking agencies, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).51 “Trading” generally means acquiring or taking positions “principally for the purpose of selling in the near term ....”52 However, “instruments held for investment, as
opposed to trading,” are not banned.53
Notwithstanding the general prohibitions of the Volcker rule, there are
significant exemptions. These “permitted activities” include transactions in
U.S. government or agency obligations, certain market-making activities,
certain risk-mitigating hedging activities, and certain transactions in securities and other instruments on behalf of customers.54 There are also other
exemptions for regulated insurance companies and offshore transactions.55
The Volcker rule also prohibits banking entities from acquiring or retaining certain ownership interests in, or sponsoring,56 a hedge fund or private
50

See supra note 12.
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–21, 1630. “It does not apply to commodities such as precious or base metals, or energy or agricultural products, nor does it apply to foreign exchange
or loans.” Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 66.
52
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1630.
53
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 66.
54
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1624.
55
For example, the Dodd-Frank Act exempts from the proprietary trading ban certain
transactions in securities and other financial instruments by a regulated insurance company, or its affiliate. Id. at 1623–24.
The Dodd-Frank Act also exempts proprietary trading conducted by a
banking entity pursuant to Section 4(c)(9) or 4(c)(13) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841, but only if the trading occurs
“solely outside of the United States” and the banking entity is not
directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a banking entity organized
under US or state law.
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 67 (citing DoddFrank Act, § 619, 124 Stat. at 1625–26). Another exemption permits a banking entity to
make “[i]nvestments in ... small business investment companies,” certain “investments
designed primarily to promote the public welfare,” and “investments that are qualified
rehabilitation expenditures [related] to a qualified rehabilitated building or certified
historic structure.” § 619, 124 Stat. at 1624.
56
A banking entity “sponsors” a covered fund by:
(A) [serving] as a general partner, managing member, or trustee of [the]
fund;
51
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equity fund.57 There are several exemptions from these restrictions as well.
A banking entity can organize and offer a fund, and be its general partner
or managing member if the banking entity provides investment advisory or
other services, if the fund is organized in connection with those services
and if the fund is offered only to customers of the banking entity.58 In addition, the banking entity may only have a de minimis investment59 in the
fund, the banking entity may not enter into certain transactions with the
fund, and the banking entity may not guarantee or insure the obligations or
performance of a private fund.60 The banking entity also may not share a
name with the fund, and “no director or employee of a banking entity [may
have] ... an interest in a private fund, except for any director or employee
who is directly engaged in providing advisory services.”61 Finally, adequate
(B) ... select[ing] or ... control[ling] (or [having] employees, officers, or
directors, or agents who constitute) a majority of the directors, trustees,
or management of the fund; or
(C) [sharing] with the fund, for corporate, marketing, promotional, or
other purposes, the same name or a variation of the same name.
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1630.
57
Covered funds include the following:
The ban on certain relationships with “hedge funds” and “private equity
funds” applies to any fund that relies on either Section 3(c)(1) (the exemption for funds with less than 100 US beneficial owners) or 3(c)(7)
(the exemption for funds with owners who meet the definition of “qualified purchasers,” principally institutions and individuals with large investment portfolios) of the ICA for its exemption from registration under
that Act, and similar funds as are designated by the agencies. Private funds
not ordinarily considered to be the market equivalent of hedge funds or
private equity funds, but which rely on either 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7), could be
covered. For example, the ban may apply to collateralized debt obligations or other bank loan funds and securitization special purpose entities
that rely on these exemptions, although the Dodd-Frank Act includes
what appears to be a blanket exception for a banking entity’s sale or securitization of loans “in a manner otherwise permitted by law.”
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 68.
58
§ 619(d)(1)(G)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1624–25.
59
§ 619(d)(1)(G)(iii), 124 Stat. at 1626. The de minimis investment provision permits
a banking entity to make investments in covered funds under the fiduciary exemption for
purposes of either “(i) establishing the fund and providing the fund with sufficient initial
equity for investment to permit the fund to attract unaffiliated investors; or (ii) making a
de minimis investment.” § 619, 124 Stat. at 1626–27. “A banking entity’s aggregate investment in all covered funds made pursuant to the de minimis investment authority must
‘be immaterial to the banking entity,’ a term to be defined by rule, and in any case may not
exceed” certain limits. Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12,
at 70. There are separate restrictions with respect to seed funding investments. See id.
60
§ 619(d)(1)(G)(v), 124 Stat. at 1625.
61
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 69.
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disclosures must be provided in the offering documents stating “that the
losses in a private fund are not borne by the banking entity.”62
It is also important to note that the SEC and the CFTC may also exempt
additional activities if they determine doing so “would promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.”63 In addition, the exemptions from the Volcker
rule proprietary trading ban and private fund restrictions will not apply if
the transaction would involve a material conflict of interest or pose a
threat to the safety and soundness of the banking entity or the financial
stability of the United States.64
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC was to complete a study and
make implementation recommendations so as to, among other things, “reduce
conflicts of interest” and “limit activities that cause undue risk.”65 It did so
in January 2011.66 Further, the SEC and the CFTC were required to consider
the study and adopt rules with respect to the Volcker Rule within nine months
of the completion of the FSOC’s study.67 The Federal Reserve Board (FRB),
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the SEC approved proposed rules in October 2011
and requested public comments that were due in February 2012.68
The Volcker rule prohibitions would take effect on the earlier of twelve
months after the date of issuance of final rules, or two years after the date
of the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment, July 21, 2012.69 Therefore, banking entities and nonbank financial companies that are supervised by the FRB generally will have two years after the effective date, until July 21, 2014, to
comply with the Volcker rule70 As this is being written, the OCC has stated
62

Id.
Id. at 71.
64
Id. at 71.
65
Id. at 72.
66
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS
ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE
EQUITY FUNDS (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%20sec%20
%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
67
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 69.
68
See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (proposed Nov. 7, 1011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-07/pdf/2011-27184.pdf.
The Commodities Futures Trading Commissions (CFTC) subsequently issued its own proposed rules. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-14/pdf/2012-935.pdf.
69
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1622–23.
70
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 73; see
Conformance Period for Entities Engaged in Prohibited Proprietary Trading or Private Equity
63
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that “many of the largest national banks and their holding affiliates have
shut down, or are in the process of winding down, exposures in trading
books that appear most clearly to fall within the statutory definition of
proprietary trading.”71
C. Policies Behind the Enactment of the Volcker Rule
One of the underlying policy considerations of the Volcker rule is that
banking entities are different from other entities with respect to their place
in our financial system.72 The monetary function of bank deposits is one of
the main reasons why deposit-taking institutions are subject to heavier regulation than non-deposit-taking institutions.73 The idea is that banking entities play a special role in the stability of the U.S. financial system and that is
the reason why they have access to certain governmental subsidies like Federal
Reserve credit, Federal Deposit Insurance, and emergency services.74 Proponents of the Volcker rule argue that banking entities should therefore be
prohibited from engaging in activities that are deemed too risky.75
The implicit contention behind these restrictions with respect to the policy justification of systemic risk is that proprietary trading for the banking
entity’s own account is too risky because it could cause the banking entity to
fail or reduce the liquidity it provides to others, disrupting credit channels.76
Fund or Hedge Fund Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 8265 (Feb. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 225).
71
Letter from Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency to Carolyn Maloney,
U.S. Rep. for N.Y. 14th District (July 18, 2012), available at http://maloney.house.gov
/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/documents/financial/20120718OCCResponseAR-M550U
_20120718_161635.pdf. As reflected in public filings, institutions that are in this process
of winding down such activities include Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorganChase,
Morgan Stanley, PNC, and Wells Fargo; the OCC further states it cannot gauge the extent
to which actions already taken fulfill the Volcker rule until there is a final rule adopted on
the definition of proprietary trading. Id.
72
Please note that another main policy consideration behind the Volcker rule is the
elimination of the conflicts of interest created by generating in blending the business of
commercial and investment banking. This Article will focus on the systemic risk issue
and not potential conflicts of interest.
73
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
74
Id.
75
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 533; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
supra note 66, at 1.
76
See KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, supra note 14, at 11–12 (postulating that
collateralization of these exposures may not be enough to mitigate against this risk
because collateral values may fall, while recognizing that banks’ current exposures are
heavily collateralized and each bank has some interest in mitigating these risks). But see
Rivière, supra note 14, at 36 (stating the failure of Amaranth “did not have a destabilizing effect because counterparties to these funds held sufficient collateral”).
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Similarly, if a hedge fund or private equity fund struggles or fails, a banking
entity with exposure to that fund may also fail themselves or reduce liquidity they provide to others, further disrupting credit channels.77 In addition,
the limitation on investing in or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity
fund ensures that banking entities cannot circumvent the proprietary trading
ban; this eliminates incentives for banks to bail out funds that they sponsor
or in which they have significantly invested.78
In January 2009, the Group of Thirty, under the leadership of a committee chaired by Paul Volcker, issued a report on financial reform aimed
at global financial stability and “intended to be useful to policymakers in
all the countries whose financial systems [were] disrupted in [the global
financial crisis starting in 2007].”79 The report states that market forces
combined with responses to those forces have led to pressure for changes
in the structure of financial systems.80 The report also states that the implication is that “at least the very large and complex banking organizations
that ... carry the major responsibility for maintaining the financial infrastructure will need to be held to more rigorous standards of prudential regulation and supervision, with new constraints on the type and scope of
their risk-taking activities.”81 The Group’s first recommendation was that
large systemically important banking institutions be limited in high risk
proprietary activities or those that present serious conflicts of interest.82
The Group also recommended that sponsorship and management of private pools of capital be limited.83
Although the Volcker rule did not appear in the House version of the
legislation that passed the House in December 2009 or in the original Senate
version, adoption of the rule was endorsed by President Obama as part of
77

See KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, supra note 14, at 13 (citing Hyun Song
Shin, Risk and Liquidity in a System Context (BIS, Working Paper No. 212, 2006)).
78
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 6.
79
Group of Thirty Working Group on Financial Reform, Financial Reform: A Framework
for Financial Stability, at 8 (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/rpt_03.shtml.
The Group of Thirty, established in 1978, is a private, nonprofit, international body composed of very senior representatives of the private
and public sectors and academia. It aims to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues, to explore the international
repercussions of decisions taken in the public and private sectors, and to
examine the choices available to market practitioners and policymakers.
History of the Group, GROUP OF THIRTY, http://www.group30.org/about.shtml (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013).
80
Group of Thirty Working Group on Financial Reform, supra note 79, at 16.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 28.
83
Id.
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the administrative reform plan in early 2010.84 The rule was included in
the Senate bill in April 2010.85 At this point in the legislative process, the
rule was not debated in the Senate and was largely unchanged, passing in
May 2010.86 While a number of changes were made to the rule in the conference process, guidance was not provided as to motivation and application of the rule. In fact, many of the material details and definitions were
left for the FSOC and the other federal banking agencies.
Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, who introduced the rule in Congress, wrote a policy essay published in 2011.87 They contend that deregulation, taking down the Glass-Steagall wall, allowed banks to take risks
that precipitated the 2007 financial crisis.88 This contention will be addressed
in Part III. The bulk of their essay focuses on abuses by banks that created
and marketed products to clients that were secretly designed to fail and the
use of client trading information against the interests of those clients and
others in the markets.89 Therefore, via the Volcker rule, they try to “restore
the spirit of regulations that followed the Great Depression” (the GlassSteagall wall).90 Because it is the spirit of the Glass-Steagall wall that motivated the Volcker rule, this Article will now turn to the history of banking
regulation in general, focusing on the expansion of bank services that led
to the Glass-Steagall wall, the factors that led to the deconstruction of the
Glass-Steagall wall, and the erection of the Volcker wall.
II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT SYSTEMIC RISK AND BANKING LAWS
IN THE U.S.
A. Early Regulators of State Chartered Banks—The First and Second
Banks of the U.S.
Before 1791, the American banking system consisted mostly of unstable
state chartered banks.91 Many state banks issued notes that were not backed
84

See Kevin Drawbaugh, White House Recommits to “Volcker Rule” Bank Trade Ban,
REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61L3UL20100224.
85
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 535–36.
86
See id. at 536–37.
87
Id. at 515.
88
See id. at 516.
89
Id. at 523, 525.
90
Id. at 516.
91
This does not include the Bank of North America ratified in early 1781 but its charter
was repealed in 1785 due to charges of favoritism of foreigners and unfair competition. 1
JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM CHRISTOPHER
COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492–1900), at 86–88 (2002) [hereinafter MARKHAM,
FINANCIAL HISTORY].
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by specie—gold or silver—redeemable at the bank’s office.92 This meant
each bank had its own currency, which caused interregional issues.93 In
order to stabilize and improve the nation’s credit with respect to the debt
from the Revolutionary War and to create a standard form of currency, the
First Bank of the United States was chartered by Congress in 1791.94 It
was responsible for twenty percent of the currency supply while state banks
accounted for the rest.95 Restrictions on the bank stemmed from fears of
concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few.96 The Bank of the United
States was prohibited, for example, “from investing in land or buildings and
from dealing in goods, wares, merchandise, or commodities.”97
After Alexander Hamilton, the bank’s champion, left the position of
Secretary of the Treasury, the new Secretary of the Treasury advised that the
government could raise money by selling its shares in the bank.98 Congress
agreed and the bank’s charter was allowed to expire in 1811.99 Competing
private banks resented the Bank of the United States and were able to prevent its charter renewal by the Congress in 1811.100
The debt of the nation from the War of 1812 led to an increase in state
banks’ notes and inflation skyrocketed because most state chartered banks
suspended specie payments.101 As a result, Congress agreed to form the Second Bank of the United States in 1816.102 The Second Bank of the United
States served as an early regulator of the wildcat banks, in that it held large
quantities of other banks’ notes in reserve and could discipline banks that
it was concerned were over-issuing notes with the threat of redeeming those
92

Id. at 168.
Id. at 168–69.
94
Id. at 75. A central banking system was quite controversial to some of the founding
fathers. England had tried to place the colonies under the control of the Bank of England
prior to the Revolutionary War. Some founding fathers were in favor of a central bank.
95
Id. at 88–89; The First Bank of the United States (1791–1811), AMERICAN HISTORY:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/essays
/general/a-brief-history-of-central-banking/the-first-bank-of-the-united-states-(1791-1811)
.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
96
Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall
vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1082 (2010) [hereinafter Markham, The
Subprime Crisis].
97
Id. at 1083.
98
First Bank of the United States, http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011
/08/HIST312-5.1.3-First-Bank-of-the-United-States.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
99
Id.
100
Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1083.
101
See Second Bank of the United States/Portrait Gallery, U.S. HISTORY, http://www
.ushistory.org/tour/second-bank.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
102
Id.
93
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notes.103 Andrew Jackson feared that a powerful private institution would
be susceptible to corruption and refused to renew the bank’s charter in 1832,
pulling federal deposits from the bank.104 The bank was crippled and its
federal charter expired in 1836.105 Also in 1836, President Jackson declared
in the Specie Circular (Coinage Act) by executive order that the government
would only accept gold or silver for payment of land, which caused runs on
the banks and a wave of bank failures.106
B. Informal Regulation—The Free Banking Era
The period from 1837 to the Civil War was known as the free banking
era since there was no central bank and states controlled their own bank
charters.107 Banks could generally enter into the banking business by depositing government bonds with state auditors.108 The government bonds were
the collateral that backed their bank notes.109 In addition, banks were generally required to redeem their notes on demand in specie.110 While there was
no central bank, the Suffolk Bank played this role to a certain extent with
respect to disciplining banks that were issuing too many notes, clearing payments, and exchanging notes. Also in 1853, the New York Clearinghouse
Association was established and provided a way for banks to exchange notes
and checks and settle accounts.111 Many contend that this kind of free banking is instable and cite bank failures in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota
during this era as evidence.112
103

Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1084.
See MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 91, at 144.
105
Id. at 146 (discussing how the Second Bank “failed in its effort to obtain a federal
charter” but “was able to carry on its banking activities ... through a charter granted by
Pennsylvania”). See generally Edwin J. Perkins, Lost Opportunities for Compromise in the
Bank War: A Reassessment of Jackson’s Veto Message, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 531 (1987).
106
See MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 91, at 148.
107
See MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 91, at 170 (discussing specific examples of state regulation of bank charters during this period); see also Arthur J. Rolnick &
Warren E. Weber, New Evidence on the Free Banking Era, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1080, 1080
(1983) (describing the lack of regulation during this period and the attendant problems as
“often cited as evidence that banking should be regulated”).
108
See Hugh Rockoff, The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination, 6 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 141, 141 (1974).
109
See id.; Rolnick & Weber, supra note 107, at 1083.
110
Rolnick & Weber, supra note 107, at 1083.
111
A History of Central Banking in the United States, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/student/central
bankhistory/bank.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). See id. at 177.
112
Rolnick & Weber, supra note 107, at 1084. Kam Hon Chu, Is Free Banking More Prone
to Bank Failures Than Regulated Banking?, 16 CATO J., no. 1, Spring/Summer 1995, at 48.
104

200

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:181

C. The National Banking System, Federal Reserve Act and Stock Market
Crash of 1929
The Civil War led to a “dual” banking system in which a bank could
adopt a state charter, which would be regulated by state regulators, or a national charter, which would be regulated by the OCC.113 State banks could
not issue their own notes that could serve as a circulating currency.114
With the need to finance the Civil War and multiple currencies in the
form of state bank notes circulating, interest in a National Bank was renewed.115 The original National Banking Act of 1863116 was enacted with
the main goal of creating a single national currency.117 It created national
banks that were able to issue United States Treasury backed bank notes,
which were printed by the government itself.118
The number of bank notes allowed to be issued was contingent upon
the bank’s capital level deposited with the Comptroller of the Currency. To
further regulate currency, the Act also placed a tax on notes issued by state
and local banks, which effectively drove non-federally issued notes out of circulation.119 The National Banking Act of 1864 replaced the National Banking
Act of 1863.120 The new Act also established federally issued bank charters.121
The new federal chartering took banking regulation and authority away from
corrupt state governments.122 Under the National Banking Act of 1864, a
national bank’s role was to invest its funds in short-term, self-liquidating
loans to finance goods in the process of production or exchange.123 However, national banks had difficulty conducting such limited operations and
surviving because they had to compete with state-chartered banks and trust
companies.124 They therefore took advantage of what some call a “loophole”
in the law that permitted these banks to perform activities “incidental” but

113

Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1084 (citations omitted).
Id.
115
See Richard S. Grossman, U.S. Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.NET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY (Feb. 2, 2010, 6:21 PM), http://eh
.net/encyclopedia/article/grossman.banking.history.us.civil.war.wwii.
116
National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
117
Grossman, supra note 115.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
121
See Grossman, supra note 115.
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Id.
123
White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act, supra note 3, at 34.
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See id.
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necessary to their operations.125 Courts broadly interpreted this to mean the
national banks could do what was not specifically prohibited by law.126
The national banking system suffered from many bank panics, notably
in 1873, 1893, and 1907.127 These panics included a large number of depositors attempting to get their money, causing an otherwise solvent bank
to fail.128 Depositors at other banks would then follow suit, causing the
panic to be system-wide.129 After a bad panic in 1907, the nation again began to consider a central bank.130 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created
twelve private regional federal reserve banks and a Federal Reserve Board
appointed by the President.131 It also created a single new United States
currency.132 All nationally chartered banks were required to become members and to purchase specified non-transferable stock in their regional federal reserve bank.133 They were also required to set aside a stipulated amount
of noninterest-bearing reserves with their respective reserve bank.134
D. The Rise of Commercial Banks Engaging in Investment Banking
In order to compete with state chartered banks, national commercial banks
started to supply trust services to their customers, through affiliates.135 World
War I financing needs required many national banks to handle their first security issues in the form of bonds.136 In addition to the financing needs of
World War I, there was a decline for commercial loans, which left the banks
looking for new income.137 Once banks entered the securities business, they
found commercial banking and investment banking to be complementary.
Commercial banks had large numbers of customers to tap into for the purchase of the securities, so they were able to charge smaller commissions than

125

Id.
Id.
127
See Grossman, supra note 115.
128
See id.
129
Id.
130
See id.
131
Id.
132
Id. (discussing an elastic currency as a means by which “components of the money
supply (gold and silver certificates, national bank notes) [are] able to expand or contract
particularly rapidly”).
133
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 252, 257.
134
§ 2, 38 Stat. at 270–71.
135
See White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act, supra note 3, at 34.
136
See EMMANUEL N. ROUSSAKIS, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION
287 (3d ed. 1997); White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act, supra note 3, at 34.
137
White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act, supra note 3, at 34–35.
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investment bankers who had a smaller client base.138 Because of the banks’
distribution networks, they could obtain desirable participations in underwriting syndicates.139 Banks could also use existing parent banks’ offices
to sell the securities.140 In return, banks could take advantage of securities
research staffs to analyze both purchases for the bank, and collateral.141
Given these advantages and the limited role prescribed for national banks
in the National Banking Act of 1864, national banks began using affiliated
trust companies to engage in securities businesses.142 For example, National
City Company, an “investment affiliate” of National City Bank, was organized in 1911.143 National City Bank’s officers and shareholders owned, via
trustees, all of the stock of the company in proportion to their ownership
interest in the National City Bank.144 This beneficial interest in the investment company was tied to the shares of the bank, in that sale of bank stock
included the corresponding shares of the beneficial interest in the investment company.145 This was evidenced by a stamp on the back of the bank
shares stating that the beneficial interest in the company went with the
bank shares.146 Other banks carried an affiliate as an investment of the bank,
or a holding company owned both the investment affiliate and the bank.147
The investment banking done by affiliates of commercial banks grew.
From 1927 to 1930, the level of participation in all bond issues by banks and
banks’ affiliates increased from 36.8 percent to 61.8 percent.148 National
City Company, for example, an affiliate of National City Bank, was not subject to the limitations of National City Bank and could therefore engage in
any lawful business, including investing in shares of sixteen banks and trust
companies and other businesses.
In 1911, U.S. Solicitor General Fredrick W. Lehman considered whether
National City Bank’s affiliation with National City Company violated banking
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laws. Lehman concluded that National City Company’s investments in sixteen banks and trust companies caused concern that it was gaining control
over banks. He thus found that National City’s holding of bank stock did
violate federal banking laws.149 National City Company did not respond to
the ruling and ultimately, President William Taft asked to handle the matter
but did not pursue it.150 A congressional subcommittee, the Pujo Committee,
was formed two years later in 1913 to investigate Wall Street bankers and
criticism of securities affiliates was reignited.151 Although the committee itself garnered press, there was no resulting legislation.152
E. Erecting the Glass-Steagall Wall
Yet another investigation, the Pecora Investigation, was initiated almost
twenty years later, on March 4, 1932, by the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency to investigate the causes of the 1929 stock market
crash.153 On October 24, 1929, “Black Thursday,” the stock market lost
around nine percent of its value by the end of the day.154 Several bankers,
including Charles E. Mitchell,155 then president of the National City Bank of
New York, used their financial resources to bid on large blocks of blue chip
stocks at prices above the current market in an effort to halt the slide.156 It
worked temporarily, but by October 29, 1929, “Black Tuesday,” the Dow had
lost twelve percent more.157 Some sources say that in total, “$25 billion—
some $319 billion in today’s dollars—was lost in the 1929 crash.”158 In addition, the market would not return to its pre-crash statistics until 1954.159
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Among other abuses, in its report the Pecora commission discussed
“abuses arising out of the interrelationship of commercial and investment
banking.”160 The commission discussed investment banks that were affiliated with large commercial banks as a “prolific source of evil.”161 The report
states that these affiliates were instrumentalities employed “to speculate in
their own stock, to participate in market operations designed to manipulate
the price of securities, and to conduct other operations in which commercial
banks are forbidden by law to engage.”162 For example, the report goes on to
detail National City Bank’s creation of its investment affiliate, National City
Company. According to the report, the purpose of National City Company
was to allow National City Bank “to make investments not within the scope
of the bank’s power.”163 One historian called the independence of City’s investment bank, National City Company, “a masterpiece of legal humor.”164
The report further concluded that commercial banks breached fiduciary duties
to depositors who sought “disinterested investment counsel” because commercial banks referred them to their affiliates.165
The commission questioned Charles E. Mitchell, who was elected president of National City Bank in 1921 and chairman in 1929, for losses concerning potential conflicts of interest of the intersection between commercial
banking and investment banking, excessive pay, and tax avoidance.166 Senator
Glass said of him: “Mitchell more than any 50 men is responsible for this stock
crash.”167 These hearings mostly identified problems with respect to conflicts
of interest in blending commercial banking and investment banking and did
not focus on systemic risk.168
F. Deregulation: Gramm-Leach-Blilely
In the 1960s, banks began looking for new sources of income to compensate for inflation.169 The then Comptroller of the Currency, James Saxon,
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encouraged this by taking an expansive approach to the banking laws.170 He
permitted commercial banks and affiliates to engage in an expanding list and
volume of securities activities.171 Some of these activities were prohibited
by the courts172 but by the time the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted
in 1999, many felt that the Glass-Steagall wall had already come down.173
In 1998, a year before Gramm-Leach-Bliley tore down Glass-Steagall’s
wall, Citicorp, a commercial bank holding company, merged with an insurance company to form a corporation that combined banking, securities, and
insurance services. This merger was technically a violation of the GlassSteagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 but the Federal
Reserve granted Citicorp a temporary waiver. Subsequently, Gramm-Leach
Bliley was enacted, tearing down Glass-Steagall’s wall, removing the prohibition of commercial banks from entering into securities and insurance
businesses.174 The stated purpose of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was to
“enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a ...
framework for the affiliation of banks, security firms, insurance companies,
and other financial service providers.”175
III. DOES THE BLENDING OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AND INVESTMENT
BANKING PRODUCE THE ALLEGED HARM, INCREASED SYSTEMIC RISK?
Does the blending of commercial banking and investment banking produce the alleged harm, increased systemic risk? It is important to reiterate
170
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that justifications for prohibiting blending usually rely on two separate rationales. One is that certain conflicts of interest injure the public. The other
is that the blending increases systemic risk. This Article will focus on the
latter, systemic risk, leaving possible solutions to the issues of conflicts of
interest for another discussion.
A. The Great Depression
First, consider the assertions that the blending played a significant role
in the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent banking crisis. Much of
the blame for the banking crisis after 1929 was put on commercial banks’
investment banking activities through their bond departments and through
affiliated securities firms.176 Hearings on the bill that would become the
Banking Act of 1933 uncovered abuses in the activities of the security affiliates.177 Senator Glass stated: “[T]hese affiliates, I repeat, were the most
unscrupulous contributors, next to the debauch of the New York Stock
Exchange, to the financial catastrophe which visited this country and was
mainly responsible for the depression under which we have been suffering
since.”178 It is difficult to tease out the role that the investment banking
activities of commercial banks played in the crisis of 1929. Nevertheless,
while the congressional hearings generated buzz about the blending’s
harm to the soundness of banks, most of the actual testimony in hearings
convened in 1931 focused on the potential conflicts of interest in the
blending as opposed to the potential for increased systemic risk.179
It was also alleged that the blending may create liquidity issues for
commercial banks because a bank would hold short-term demand deposits
while being exposed to marketable securities with long-term maturities.180
Securities, moreover, may have unanticipated losses because the market
unexpectedly fluctuates. If the market turns down, a blended bank’s assets
values (securities for its own account) may decrease at the same time that
the depositors will withdraw their funds and borrowers would default on
the loans. In addition, it was thought that a bank may make investment
decisions it would not otherwise make but for the blending, such as lending money or purchasing from a securities affiliate or certain customers on
176
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preferential terms.181 This too could affect a bank’s liquidity, making it
more susceptible to panics and failure.182
These theories have not necessarily been borne out by the statistics.
Looking at four different liquidity measures to determine the potential influence of securities affiliates on commercial banks, Eugene White stated
that national banks’ liquidity did not appear to have been weakened by the
presence of an affiliated securities business.183 On the contrary, White
found a “significantly higher survival rate of banks with securities operations during the massive bank failures of 1930–1933.”184 He stated that
“[w]hile 26.3% of all national banks failed in this period, only 6.5% of the
62 banks which had affiliates in 1929 and 7.6% of the 145 banks which
conducted large operations through their bond departments closed their
doors.”185 He does concede that this may be due to the size of these banks
and their ability to achieve more diversification and economies of scale.186
White also found, using data from 1931, the year when the largest number
of banks with securities affiliates failed, that the presence of an affiliate
appears to have reduced the probability of bank failure.187 Friedman and
Schwartz argue that banks would have failed at a much faster rate if the instability was due to the assets they had accumulated in the 1920s (securities).188
William Shughart found further evidence against the culpability of
blending in that it was the smaller, rural institutions that did not have
much blending that accounted for the majority of bank failures throughout
the 1920s and early 1930s.189 In addressing the issue of whether the larger
banks could have contributed to the collapse of the smaller banks in funneling worthless investment securities to the smaller banks, he stated that a
competing explanation should be considered.190 That potential competing
explanation is that the smaller banks were hurt by the failing agricultural
industry, highlighting that the default rate on agricultural loans was so
high that many smaller banks would have failed anyway.191 In addition,
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what about the argument that investment banking is too risky and might
injure the banks? White found that while the securities affiliates’ return
was subject to a high degree of risk (as evidenced by the mean and standard deviation being higher than for the banks), this does not seem to have
generated wider fluctuations in the banks’ combined earnings.192
Some authors even go so far as to suggest alternate explanations for
the passage of the Glass-Steagall wall including the interests of investment
banks in keeping commercial banks from their business, the interests of
commercial banks in keeping investment banks from their business, and
the interest of the U.S. Treasury in eliminating a competitor, private securities, for the purchase of the Treasury’s securities by banks.193
B. Did the Blending Play a Critical Role in the Financial Crisis of 2007?
Senators Merkley and Levin, the Volcker rule’s drafters, state in their
policy essay that “[p]roprietary trading [including investments in separate private funds managed or sponsored by the bank] played a critical role in the
recent global financial crisis and subsequent recession.”194 They state that
“the lessons of the Great Depression were forgotten over time” and that
“deregulation enabled banks to take the risks that precipitated the current
financial crisis.”195 They contend that the Glass-Steagall wall protected U.S.
financial stability and that “similar to the Great Crash of 1929 ... proprietary
trading losses had once again played a central role in bringing the financial
system to its knees.”196 The Senators state that firms’ disclosed proprietary
trading revenues and losses demonstrate that those losses were significant.197
The Senators are not alone in blaming proprietary trading for financial
instability. As mentioned above, two years earlier in January 2009, the
Group of Thirty, under the leadership of a committee chaired by Paul
Volcker, issued a report on financial reform aimed at global financial stability and “intended to be useful to policymakers in all the countries whose
financial systems [were] disrupted in [the global financial crisis starting in
2007].”198 The group’s first recommendation was that large systemically important banking institutions should be limited in their proprietary securities
192
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trading activities that present particularly high risks and serious conflicts
of interest.199 The group also recommended that sponsorship and management of private pools of capital be prohibited.200 While admitting that
“there were many factors other than proprietary trading contributing to the
breakdown of the financial markets,”201 Paul Volcker stated in his commentary to the Volcker Rule that “losses within large trading positions
were in fact a contributing factor for some of our most systemically important institutions.”202
Were Senators Merkely and Levin correct when they contended that the
blending of commercial banking and investment banking played a “critical
role” in the crisis of 2007 by allowing banks to purchase and sell financial
instruments for their own account, and by allowing banks to invest in private funds managed or sponsored by the bank? In other words, was it the
removal of the Glass-Steagall wall by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999
that led to the financial crisis in 2007? This debate has been fought over the
front page of newspapers. For example, a front-page New York Times article
pointed out that the “Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act ... removed barriers ... that had
been instituted to reduce the risk of economic catastrophes.”203 Phil Gramm
responded instead, fingering faulty monetary policy and mortgage lending.204
This Article posits that it has not been demonstrated that deregulation
led to the financial crisis. In fact, deregulation, or the removal of the GlassSteagall wall, may have allowed banks to achieve diversification, liquidity,
complementaries, and global competitiveness. But instead of looking at
the underlying causes of the excessive risk taking, legislators want to ban
proprietary trading altogether, and with it lose the potential benefits. This
Article argues that we must look at some of the more nuanced causes of
the financial crisis and not just throw the baby, the potential benefits of
deregulation, out with the bathwater, excessive risk taking.
Banks were in the business of mortgage-backed securities, which were
blamed for much of the losses, well before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act took
down the Glass-Steagall wall. In 1987, the OCC made a determination that
the Glass-Steagall Act did not prevent a national bank from selling mortgagebacked securities and the Second Circuit upheld that determination.205 Part
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of the Second Circuit’s reasoning was that it recognized that the increased
liquidity provided by such business would help banks as they fund longterm mortgage loans with short-term deposits.206
In addition to mortgage-backed securities, subprime mortgage lending
and excessive risk taking is seen as a culprit in the financial crisis.207 Subprime lending is generally a loan to a borrower that is not creditworthy.208
It was not the lack of a wall between commercial and investment banking
that made it possible for banks to enter the subprime mortgage market. In
fact, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) encouraged this
kind of lending by making loaning to subprime areas a condition for receiving approval from bank regulators for bank mergers.209 These loans
could be securitized, which meant banks had a way to move subprime
loans off their balance sheets.210 Note that the CRA required that these
loans be made consistent with safe and sound practices, but that there was
clearly incentive for excessive risk taking with the promise of a CRA credit
reward.211 Banks also failed to perform due diligence with respect to the
creditworthiness of borrowers, perhaps on the mistaken belief that a rising
housing market would allow for refinancing and avoid foreclosures.212 In
addition to failing to perform due diligence, banks may have taken excessive risks because of the failure of ratings agencies and risk assessment
models to adequately capture the risks associated with certain modern financial instruments, such as credit default swaps213 and securitized obligations.214 Additional factors that some authors say may have contributed to
206
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the financial crisis include federal interest rate policies and mark-to-market
accounting.215 The Glass-Steagall wall would not have prevented incentivization for lenders to make subprime loans, failures in performing due diligence,
and failures at measuring the credit risk of modern financial instruments.
There are clearly issues with banks engaging in proprietary trading.
Namely, as Senators Merkley and Levin point out, proprietary trading
banks that trade may gather information from their banking clients and
exploit it.216 This leads to a conflict of interest between the banks’ motivations and their clients’ motivations. The most egregious conflict of interest
examples include designing products to fail, selling them to clients and
then making trading bets on the products’ collapse.217 Proponents of the
Volcker rule often focus on these conflict of interest rationales. If conflict
of interest is the main harm we are trying to address, it may make more
sense to consider other solutions such as additional disclosures and regulations that protect the public from such conflicts. Therefore, with respect to
the argument that proprietary trading by banks increases systemic risk, this
Article concludes that this has not been demonstrated. It seems that we
should look at the incentives for excessive risk such as the failure of risk
ratings and models and skewed incentives for bad business judgment before taking the drastic step of banning proprietary trading altogether.
CONCLUSION
The claims that the Glass-Steagall Act and Volcker rule walls are
needed to decrease systemic risk have not been supported. We need to
study systemic risks by gaining a deeper understanding of the links between financial intermediation, money, and credit flows. We need to gain
balance sheets, removing concern of undue risk from the banks perspective and explaining that risk assessment models failed to predict the subprime crisis).
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a better understanding of excessive risk taking and the cause, incentives,
and instrumentalities of such risk taking. The Glass-Steagall wall seemed
to have been erected in 1933 to address conflicts of interest in the blending
of commercial and investment banks and as a purported fix to the horrors
of the Great Depression in the name of regulating systemic risk. White’s
statistics demonstrate not only that the blending may not increase systemic
risk, but that there may be diversification, complementaries, and economies of scope benefits to the blending. Further, the financial crisis of 2007
was likely caused by failures in our financial system that reach beyond
proprietary trading in general. If we are trying to correct potential conflicts
of interest, why not regulate and require additional disclosures that protect
the public from such conflicts of interest? If we are trying to reduce systemic risk, why not study excessive risk taking in general and regulate
more precisely instead of banning proprietary trading by banks and systemically significant entities altogether?
This Article posits that we need a better understanding of systemic risk
before we erect a wall that may decrease economies of scope and complementaries of these businesses. Leaving the industry without the wall may
in fact, because of diversification, make banks less susceptible to failure.
More importantly, a wall may put U.S. banks at a global competitive disadvantage. This Article posits that in the legislative histories of both the
Glass-Steagall and the Volcker rule, legislators focus on conflicts of interest
issues that can be solved in other ways, such as additional disclosures and
regulations without the cost to diversification, economies of scope, and
global competition. At the very least, whether the blending increases systemic risk needs more study. It seems that the Glass-Steagall wall and the
Volcker rule wall have been more political than economic in satisfying
public outcry to do something, anything, about the respective disasters.

